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Nenad Miščević
he Dilemmas of Just War  
and the Institutional Pacifism
Članek predstavlja razširjeno argumentacijo v prid vidiku, ki zagovarja temeljno dolž-
nost vseh mednarodnopolitičnih akterjev za uspešno vzpostavitev in vzdrževanje glo-
balnega sistema ohranitve miru, v obliki močne kozmopolitske institucije. Argument-
acija združuje kantovski pogled institucionalne temeljne strukture z avguštinovskimi 
pomisleki glede pravične vojne. Najprej našteva razloge, ki kažejo, da vojna ustvarja 
trajne in dramatične moralne konlikte za vse udeležence. Glede na nesprejem-
ljivost tovrstnih dramatičnih moralnih konliktov sledi močna in nujna dolžnost 
preprečevanja vojne, ki velja za vsakogar. Individualni paciizem je prešibak, da bi za-
gotavljal mir, zato je potrebna institucionalna »temeljna struktura« v obliki zanesljive-
ga mednarodnega sistema. Večpolarni sistemi ne zagotavljajo miru, celo nasprotno. 
»Demokratični mir« je najuspešnejši, ko je podprt z nadnacionalnim sistemom. Zato 
je vzpostavitev in vzdrževanje globalnega sistema vzdrževanja miru, tj. močne koz-
mopolitanske institucije, edini praktični način za zagotavljanje miru. Vloga manjših 
držav, kot je Slovenija, je v obrambi tega razumevanja v institucijah, kot sta npr. ZN ali 
Varnostni svet, kjer je njihov glas večji kot ga sicer zagotavlja njihova dejanska velikost, 
bogastvo ali moč.
Ključne besede: pravična vojna, paciizem, kozmopolitizem, Avguštin, Kant
1 INTRODUCTION: LAMENTING THE NECESSITY  
OF JUST WAR
War has been with us for a long time1. It has been a prominent topic in the 
global media at least in the last decade; in the decade before it was omnipresent 
in the media of this country, Slovenia, and physically present, in all its bru-
tality in its immediate neighborhood. Now we live with insecurity concerning 
Afghanistan, and possibly Iran. Legal scholars and ethicists have been quick to 
1 An early version of the paper has been presented at a conference of Society for Applied Phi-
losophy in Leeds. I wish to thank Friderik Klampfer for discussions, and Tea Logar for invita-
tion to publish.
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react to recent events, and to produce an impressive body of literature, denounc-
ing the horrors of war and discussing the way of avoiding them. he mainstream 
view has it, in my view rightly, that war is forbidden except in very limited kinds 
of cases. Even threats are seen as unacceptable. Remember Henry V threaten-
ing the governor of Harleur: »he gates of mercy shall be all shut up,/And the 
lesh’d soldier, rough and hard of heart,/ In liberty of bloody hand shall range 
/ With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass/ Your fresh-fair virgins and 
your lowering infants./« (Henry V, 3.3. 87–91).2 No ethicist would condone 
this. And of course, mere threatening is trile compared to the actual execution. 
Henry knows what he is talking about mentioning »Your fathers taken by the 
silver beards,/And their most reverend heads dash’d to the walls,/ Your naked 
infants spitted upon pikes.« (3.3. 114–117). he war in former Yugoslavia was 
full of such events; wars are like this, and to the present-day moral sensibility 
they rightly appear morally horriic. 
In this paper I want to sketch an argument aiming to show that even just 
warfare is only minimally and barely just, and that therefore the duty to pre-
vent war is the fundamental duty in international politics. I want to do this 
starting from the following regularity, easy to illustrate. Consider successful 
threats, as Henry’s was, and as the mutual nuclear deterrence was. On the one 
hand, they are morally clearly unacceptable, on the other, they did prevent 
much greater harms. How is one to decide? How does one tell in advance? 
And, assuming one wants to threaten, and not execute threats, how does one 
make one’s threats credible?3 Once the actual warfare starts, a sensitive and 
honest person deciding about how to defend oneself and one’s community 
will be again caught in the net of dilemmas. he Second World War was a rare 
example of the clearly just cause on the side of the Allies, namely stopping the 
Nazis. But at the level of ius ad bellum decision were hard and oten morally 
tainted. Should we bomb German and Japanese towns and kill lots of civil-
ians, some of them completely innocent, some guilty in a indirect manner, or 
should we sacriice more of our soldiers, young men who did nothing wrong 
2 See also the comments by Scott Fraser, Henry V and the Performance of War in Ros King, Paul 
J. C. M. Franssen (eds.), Shakespeare and War, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
3 Ethicists, like for instance Gregory Kavka, warned that intimidation is rather appalling: at least 
two thousand megatons of nuclear weapons were directed on USSR. If you agree that it would 
be terrible to carry out the intent and kill millions of civilians as a revenge for the Soviet attack, 
you agree that the intent itself is bad. Catholic ethicists in America were especially prominent 
critics. Military experts were stalling: it is not necessary to really realise the attack, it is enough 
to intimidate the enemy, and to do this, no murderous intent is needed. Ethicists, including 
prominently Kavka himself, famously responded that this was absurdity: suppose someone of-
fers you a large amount of money just so you would form an intent that is a bit uncomfortable 
for you, for example to drink something which will make you sick all night long, some mild and 
harmless poison; but you are not required to realise the intent later. Could you produce that 
intent at all, asked Kavka in his famous ‘tocsin puzzle’. I can't really threaten if I don't have an 
intent, and the intent here is horrible.
71
revija za evropsko ustavnost
The Dilemmas of Just War and the Institutional Pacifism
(2010) 13
www.revus.eu
before entering the army? he conduct of war, even on a just side, presents 
innumerous dilemmas, that make such warfare perpetually border with in-
justice and oten just cross the thin red line. In practice, there is no clean just 
warfare. Since the horrors of war are so morally repugnant, and there is prac-
tically no way to keep one’s hands clean while ighting, it seems that avoiding 
them must take precedence over many interests, and even many duties. he 
duty to avoid war is a basic political duty. In context of international politics 
it might be the basic duty. 
If this argument is promising, and the conclusion about peace-securing as 
the fundamental duty holds, it can be combined with further considerations. 
Very importantly, states have been bad guardians of peace, oten better in wag-
ing war than in securing peace. Individual conversions to paciism don’t help 
on bigger scale. One could argue that peace needs a irm »basic structure«, of 
a supra-statal, or rather cosmopolitan cast. his point of view is paciistic, be-
cause it condemns war and believes that every warfare, including the one done 
in self-defense, is deeply problematic. But it difers from other forms of paci-
ism, because it emphasizes the role of supra-state institutions, and transfers 
an important part of the burden on them. I shall call this attitude the institu-
tional paciism or paciism of institutions. I will sketch this line of argument 
for institutional paciism towards the end of the paper. I have to be very brief, 
and I apologize to the reader; I want him or her to see the whole picture, and 
this means little space for detailed arguments for particular steps and claims (I 
particularly regret not being able to discuss David Rodin’s War and self-defense, 
which I ind very congenial).
Let me conclude the Introduction by a historical note. he idea that avoiding 
war is a fundamental duty stems from the Kantian tradition. he main idea to be 
defended here (unfortunately, in a sketchy manner), that even just war is regret-
table, can be found in Saint Augustine, the oicial creator of the Christian »just 
war« doctrine. In the book XIX of his he City of God he discusses harsh dilem-
mas that plague politics and administration in the earthly community, civitas 
terrena. hen he comes to the plurality of languages and of what we would de-
scribe as proto-national communities. hey are in constant danger of conlict. 
he empire »has endeavored to impose on subject nations not only her yoke, 
but her language, as a bond of peace, so that interpreters, far from being scarce, 
are numberless. his is true; but how many great wars, how much slaughter and 
bloodshed, have provided this unity!«, he writes in Chapter 7.4 Wars are worst 
of all, and empire itself produces them incessantly. A loty Stoical sage might 
reply that a wise man should not worry; he should just abide by the just war 
doctrine. Here is Augustine’s reply:
4 Saint Augustine, he City of God, Peabody, MA, Hendrickson Publisher, 2009 (transl. by Mar-
cus Dods).
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But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather 
lament (dolebit) the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if 
they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from 
all wars. For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man 
to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to no war, would 
still be matter of grief (dolenda) to man because it is man’s wrong-doing. Let every 
one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, 
acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one either endures or thinks of them 
without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy 
because he has lost human feeling. (XIX, 7) 
At the beginning of De Civitate Dei, Augustine stresses that the worst hor-
rors of wars were in accordance with military custom: »hat It is Quite Contrary 
to the Usage of War, that the Victors Should Spare the Vanquished for the Sake 
of heir Gods«, as the title of Chapter 2, Book One has it. Later, in Chapter 5, 
he quotes Cæsar's statement regarding the universal custom of an enemy when 
sacking a city: »Even Cæsar himself gives us positive testimony regarding this 
custom; for, in his deliverance in the senate about the conspirators«, he says (as 
Sallust, a historian of distinguished veracity, writes) »that virgins and boys are 
violated, children torn from the embrace of their parents, matrons subjected to 
whatever should be the pleasure of the conquerors, temples and houses plun-
dered, slaughter and burning rife; in ine, all things illed with arms, corpses, 
blood, and wailing.«5
We can combine the two groups of his statements to ofer a coherent picture 
of the evils of war: irst, the habitual customs of war condone and even recom-
mend worse horrors. Second, if, in spite of this, someone managed to wage a 
just warfare, this would still be a matter for regret. he idea that even the most 
just wars are regrettable is the main point in our present context. here are two 
immediate questions about the connection with our argument from dilemmas: 
irst, did Augustine think of dilemmas accompanying just war? Second, when 
he talks about regret, the »grief« or »mental pain« (in Latin just dolor in both 
cases), does he mean the moral regret, or just »bad feeling« that is not strictly 
moral.6 To start with the last one, it seems that pointing to mere feeling bad 
about one’s actions is not an answer to stoics; a stoic ethicist would dismiss it as 
a mere accidental weak passion, of no signiicance. If Augustine really wanted 
to answer the stoic, which I think he did, he had to rely on moral regret. he 
5 Augustine wrote De Civitate Dei ater the sack of Rome by Visigoths in 410, and he naturally 
talks quite a lot about horrors of war in, discussing those in Greek and Roman history, includ-
ing the horrors of civil war, the examples from the Old Testament, and the traumatic recent 
events in Rome; his list of them reads like a litany of war-crimes read by a contemporary 
prosecution attorney at an international tribunal, say International Criminal Court.
6 See on such non-moral feeling bad, for instance Tomas E. Hill, Moral Dilemmas, Gaps and 
Residues: A Kantian perspective, in H. E. Mason (ed.), Moral dilemmas and moral theory, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.
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same holds for a related more radical possible attempt to dissociate Augustine 
completely from the criticism of just war; our opponent might claim that the 
just warrior only has to grieve for the deeds of others, namely of the unjust ones, 
for the generally lamentable nature of war, not for his own deeds. But this is 
very weak against the Stoic: if the only grief of the just warrior is the grief of a 
spectator (like the bad feeling one has when watching a war documentary about 
a war distant in time and/or space), then again it is just a natural weakness with 
no moral signiicance.
As for the dilemmas, they are so much on the surface of this view of earthly, 
this-worldly politics, or immediately below it that it is hard to imagine he would 
not think of them here. Here is John Parish, author of the book on moral dilem-
mas linked with »dirty hands« in the history of political philosophy: 
Augustine is acutely aware that human life, especially in politics, is beset by una-
voidable choices that appear, at least on the surface, to constitute genuine moral 
dilemmas. And the cause of these recurrent dilemmas, according to Augustine, is 
most frequently our blurry perceptions of human motivation and the consequent 
diiculties that arise in trying to render our inevitable judgments upon them.7 
And this is why, he says, Augustine uses terms like »lamentable«, as he 
does in our passage. So, in what follows, I shall take Augustine as my protector 
saint.
Let me briely announce the steps that I will sketch in the paper. My 
Institutional Paciist Argument has constructive and critical steps. First, on the 
constructive side we have two claims, and a conclusion.
War creates perpetual and very dramatic moral conlicts for all participants. 
Such very dramatic moral conlicts are inacceptable. herefore, there is a very 
strong and urgent duty of everybody to work on prevention of war. he critical 
part picks up one option out of a longer disjunction: Firstly, Individual paciism 
is too weak to guarantee peace. herefore, a basic structure is needed, in form of 
an international system. Secondly, multi-polar systems do not guarantee peace, 
quite the contrary. Finally, the »democratic peace« alternative is most success-
ful when supported by supra-state systems. herefore, the only practical way 
to secure peace is creation and preservation of a global peace-preserving sys-
tem, i.e. a very strong cosmopolitan institutional arrangement. herefore, it is 
a primary duty in international politics to create and keep functioning a global 
peace-preserving system in the form of a very strong cosmopolitan institutional 
arrangement. 
Here is then the preview. he next section is dedicated to the defense of 
the irst premise of the positive part of the argument, namely the Augustinian 
7 John M. Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 
95. 
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suggestion that even just warfare is regrettable, and the rationale for it, namely 
the ubiquity of grave moral conlicts. he defense is lamentably short, and I 
apologize to the reader again. Section hree develops, in a very sketchy form, 
its intended cosmopolitan consequences, by pointing to the deiciency of the 
alternatives, namely individual paciism, multi-polar systems of international 
relations, and inally the statist variant of »democratic peace«.
2 MORAL CONFLICTS:  
QUANDARIES AND DILEMMAS
2.1 Examples
Here is a classical and oten recurring problem for commanders and rank-
and-ile soldiers, especially on the good side, call them G-warriors, in war situ-
ation: a small group, say three or four of G-warriors have taken by surprise a 
bigger number of prisoners, say a dozen of enemy soldiers. Unfortunately, the 
G-group just cannot guard, feed and keep in good order the enemy prisoners; it 
is small, it is in the enemy territory, and I reserves of food and water are mini-
mal. It is them or us. If prisoners are kept, the mission of the group is threat-
ened, the lives of G-warriors are at heavy risk, and keeping them alive means 
sacriicing good guys for the beneit of the bad ones. On the other hand, just 
liquidating dozen unarmed persons seems pretty much criminal. A soldier has 
a right to think of ones own security, a commanding oicer has a duty to think 
of the security of his or her subordinates; how should one decide? If you ind 
this too easy a problem, just vary the proportion: two G-warriors vs. 20, or 200 
or 2000 enemy prisoners. 
Let me use the term »moral conlict« as the neutral term for a situation in 
which the agent is facing conlicting moral demands, without a clear supremacy 
of one, and a clear sign of the nullity of its opposite. Sometimes, even quite 
oten, »dilemma« is used in this sense and I have used it so informally in the 
Introduction. However, the professional use tends nowadays to be reserved 
for objectively irresolvable conlicts, sometimes characterized as »genuine 
dilemmas«,8 and I shall henceforward use it this way.9 he conlicts that are in 
8 See Mason 1996 (n. 6).
9 For the idea of remainder, that is let no matter how the agent acts, here is an insightful com-
ment by Claudia Card: 
My use of the term »remainder« extends that of Williams in two ways. First, for Williams 
remainders are negative, produced by wrongdoing. And yet moral transactions also leave 
positive remainders when not everything good can be reciprocated. We acknowledge posi-
tive remainders in unpayable debts of gratitude. Second, for Williams remainders are not 
our lingering emotional responses but unexpiated wrongs themselves, the things inevitably 
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principle resolvable, but with a lot of diiculty, and whose resolution normally 
surpasses the means (information, acumen, time, etc.) that a good soldier has 
at his or her disposal, I shall call quandaries (some philosophers keep the term 
»dilemma« for solvable but diicult conlict, e.g. Philippa Foot10). he rest are 
philosophically uninteresting, but humanly more fortunate manageable con-
licts. To reiterate, our topics here are moral conlicts, and they are divided into
dilemmas – objectively irresolvable
quandaries – in principle resolvable, but in practice irresolvable for the agent 
in question
manageable conlicts – resolvable on time in situ, by the agent in question.
To return briely to Augustine; Parish11 writes about the omnipresence of 
dilemmas that according to him plague human history and notes that in his 
view »the reason for this tragic state of afairs is at root an epistemological prob-
lem«, namely the opacity of people’s intentions that renders agents uncertain 
and weary of each other. On this reading, most of Augustine’s worries would 
relate to what we call quandaries, since according to him our agent could decide 
morally if only she had available information; there is an objectively correct 
solution, only it is not cognitively available to her. 
Here are then examples of some types of moral conlict, many of them fa-
mous and amply discussed in the recent literature on the ethics of warfare. We 
start with the ius ad bellum and the issue of slippery slope. How much enemy 
activity is suicient for »aggression« in the technical sense that would justify 
entering war? (And what kind of threat, if any, justiies striking irst?) he is-
sue has been nicely illustrated by David Rodin (in his excellent book12) with 
the help of example of the beginning of First vs. Second World War. Should 
the Allies have reacted earlier to the Nazi moves? It would seem to many, quite 
not made right. I ind it natural, however, to think of emotional and attitudinal responses 
to such moral facts as also remainders. hus, regret, remorse, and sometimes shame and 
guilt are moral remainders. Like the insoluble parts of moral conlicts, these responses 
remain, even ater we have done what we can to set matters right. hey are rectiicatory 
responses of feeling rather than action. hey reveal important values of an agent who has 
acted wrongly or is identiied with a bad action or bad state of afairs, or those of a benei-
ciary unable to reciprocate beneits. Remainders can survive both rectiicatory action and 
hard choices in complex situations where inevitably some are wronged or receive less than 
their due and the best one can do is seek the least undesirable outcome.
Aristotle said of shame, in explaining its status as a »quasi-virtue«, that ideally occasions 
for it will not arise but that if they do, it is better to have shame than to be shameless.
Claudia Card, he Atrocity Paradigm: A heory of Evil, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2002, 169.
10 Philippa Foot, Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma, Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983), 392.
11 John M. Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
12 David Rodin, War and self-defense, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
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plausibly, that hindsight plays a signiicant role in answering the question ater 
the event, plus the knowledge of Hitler’s extermination plans, which was not 
readily available at the time of decision making (he stated some of them early 
enough in his Mein Kampf, but a reasonable paciist might have argued that 
Hitler is just showing of for domestic purposes, and that his parading with 
racist threats does not justify armed conlict). Of course, when all goes well, the 
hindsight tells the agents they were justiied ab initio, when not, it reaches the 
opposite verdict. his does not help them much in the epistemic situation in 
which Neville Chamberlain and Churchill were in the late thirties. 
Now, in a given murky situation the choice certainly does involve moral 
conlict. It might raise to the level of a quandary: challenging a well-armed, 
professional and determined opponent (like the Wehrmacht) and beginning a 
world conlict as opposed to yielding, sacriicing the freedom of a country or 
two (in the actual example Czechoslovakia and Poland), does not seem an easy 
choice. And we can imagine all sorts of analogous, but epistemically even worse 
realistic cases, e.g. those involving an enemy willing to use nuclear weapons. If 
one believes in genuine dilemmas, as I do, one might see these moral conlicts 
as indeed being bona ide examples of them.
Let me now pass to ius in bello, and to killing and/or harming of enemy sol-
diers in the warfare that is just in its origin (an ius ad bellum-just war). We begin 
with the moral situation of just warriors. First, the ordinary matters. We started 
with the example of prisoners as potential threats and with situations where it 
is almost impossible to take prisoners and keep them along. he next are active 
enemy soldiers and quasi-soldiers. First, with what moral right does one kill un-
willing enemy soldiers? What about tens of thousands of such soldiers? Next are 
quandaries about quasi-soldiers: how to distinguish them from civilians? he 
Additional Protocols to Geneva Convention optimistically assume that guerilla 
is just; but what about Taliban-style (or the pro-Milosevic ighters in Krajina) 
guerilla? A more popular topic in philosophy are less ordinary issues. F.M. 
Kamm discusses »terror-killing in a particularly horrible way« in a just warfare 
(see below for longer discussion); her focus is the mere amount of horror, and I 
would add the issues of character: what kind of person can do it? A very similar 
issue is torturing and the famous ticking bomb quandary.
he third famous group of problems concerns civilians. First, the ordinary 
situations. Here is a conlict we already mentioned, the drat problem: should 
I drat 10 000 of my compatriots-civilians or kill 2000 enemy civilians? What 
about considerations of age, involving children in the enemy civilian popula-
tion? (Similarly, the use of enemy civilians as shields.) Finally, we have well 
known »Supreme emergencies«. Here is the drat problem is supreme emergen-
cy: should I turn most of my compatriots-civilians into soldiers and put their 
life at risk, or should I kill a tenth of this number of enemy civilians?
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So much for the conlict that a just warrior is facing. But what about the 
relatively innocent unjust warrior? Many authors agree that soldiers, especially 
rank-and-ile soldiers on unjust side are oten in the position of not knowing 
that their side is unjust (and coming to know this would require background, 
intelligence, efort etc. that can’t be realistically expected) especially if the injus-
tice is moderate and not monstrous, like the Nazi case. 
A whole important line in defense of separability of ius in bello from ius ad 
bellum is grounded in this agreement. So, the conlicts these soldiers face in are 
to be taken with roughly the same moral seriousness as those of soldiers on the 
just side. 
Here are two questions and comments to this list of conlicts raised by my 
colleague and friend Fridi Klampfer. First, the conlicts seem to reserved more 
or exclusively for high commanders and not for rank and ile soldiers; they are 
the problem of the elite (call this the Elite Problem argument). Second, a doubt 
about conlicts and dirty hands: it is oten hard to act in a moral way, but if one 
is determined to do so, it is possible to ight by rules of war, and emerge with 
one’s personality unscathed by horrors of war, and one’s hands clean (he Clean 
Hands argument).
Let me try to answer. First of all, it is the rank and ile soldier who has to 
ind in oneself »the inhuman courage needed to kill a human being« as a poet, 
whose name I forgot, once said. Traditionally, one complains about the willful-
ness of ordinary soldiers who kill and rape on their own; the famous exam-
ples involve massive rapes of German civilian women by soviet soldiers, but the 
complaint goes way in the past; again, Henry V has a ine formulation: »We may 
as bootless spend our vain command/ Upon the enraged soldiers in their spoil/ 
As send precepts to the leviathan/To come ashore.« (Henry V, 3.3). Conversely, 
a soldier has a maneuvering space which allows one to do not to do bad things, 
and it is here that soldiers might get in moral conlicts as bad as their gener-
als. In the war in Croatia, Croatian soldiers conquering Serbian small towns 
in Krajina when entering almost any house risked to be killed by remaining 
pro-Milosevic guerilla ighters. he usual recipe, but not a command, was to 
irst throw a grenade into the cellar before entering, which usually meant killing 
innocent civilians. Each soldier, at each building faced the question whether to 
risk one’s own life and just enter, or whether to risk killing innocent women and 
children and then enter safely. 
Finally, consider the day-to-day decisions of low-rank commanders: for in-
stance, the choice between humanity-cum-loyalty to »their« soldiers and the 
demands of higher command in the First World war. When further ighting 
seems absurd to everyone on the ground, and generals are enthusiastic for con-
tinuing it, how is the low-rank commander supposed to act?
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Similar conlicts arise about non-acting. UN commanders and soldiers are 
famous for standing under extremely strict rules of engagement, close to those 
dictated by a very strict moral JW code. And infamous for oten doing nothing 
because of this, thus getting impaled on one horn of the dilemma between do-
ing brutal things and being ineicient and failing to protect, most famously in 
Ruanda and in Srebrenica.
To summarize, serious moral conlicts, involving massive amount of casual-
ties and bad sufering, are abundant and ubiquitous in the just warfare. Rough 
equality of alternatives makes decision extremely hard. Maybe it is not really 
incommensurability, and the root of the diiculty might be purely epistemic, as 
Augustine seems to have thought, so the conlicts would be quandaries in our 
terminology. But the mere amount of horror involved is enough to shock nor-
mal human sensibility. And there are issues of character: what kind of person 
can do it, and without moral regret? I assume that such massive, horriic and 
dramatic moral conlicts are inacceptable. So we have prima facie the material 
for the positive part of our Institutional Paciist Argument:
1. War creates perpetual and very dramatic conlicts, quandaries and per-
haps even genuine unsolvable dilemmas for all participants.
2. Dramatic conlicts are unacceptable. 
3. herefore, there is a very strong and urgent duty of everybody to work on 
prevention of war.
2.2 Discussion
Of course, this is only the beginning. here is a wealth of ethical theories 
dealing with moral conlict(s) and some literature about martial ones in par-
ticular. he general line is epitomized in the title of Michael Ignatief ’s book 
on terrorism he Lesser Evil, Political Ethics in the Time of Terror:13 since one 
of the two evils (the evil of action itself or of consequence, or both) will nor-
mally be a lesser one, it is permissible to do the action that will avoid the greater 
evil by producing the lesser one. Among anti-dilemmatists distinguish utilitar-
ians from deontologists. Virtue-ethicists, like your author, need not be against 
dilemmas, and if they are, their tactics would probably be similar to those of 
the two other camps, except for stressing the particular nature of the problem-
atic situation, and the corresponding moral insight – »perception«. Traditional 
utilitarianism would look at the ratio of relevant good or damage reasonably 
expected at each horn of the apparent dilemma, and suggest the choice of the 
dominant alternative; the chooser is in the clear, no matter how horriic the 
alternative looks. Traditional Kantian deontologism seems to exaggerate in the 
opposite direction, by absolutely prohibiting certain acts, even if they prevent 
13 Michael Ignatief, he Lesser Evil, Political Ethics in the Time of Terror, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2004.
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much worse evils. (In fact, writing about violence in revolution, Kant himself 
comes very close to the saddened Augustinian.)14
Virtue ethics is the least committed option; some versions would claim that 
the choice varies from case to case, and it is the matter of moral sensibility and 
»perception« of the virtuous warrior to recognize the right one. 
On the contemporary scene one inds more reined proposals. F. M. Kamm, 
whose work we shall discuss very briely in this section, helpfully proposes the term 
»threshold deontologists«, for philosophers, such as Rawls and Quinn who, at least 
on her reading, accept the idea that in very di cult situations (supreme emergency 
cases) one may use means which are otherwise next to absolutely prohibited.15 She 
is also very much into such determining thresholds. Here is a ictional example in-
vented by her, one among many (we shall limit ourselves to this one, with regret): 
Suppose many people will shortly come at you with a deadly force. Perhaps they 
would rather not be doing this but they are under the control of a surrounding pop-
ulation. (So they are not malicious aggressors.). It is permissible, I believe for you to 
stop them if you can, even by killing them. However, you have insuicient force to 
stop them, and you would certainly die having killed only a few. You have two ways 
to save your life. One is to surrender. he other is to kill one of the combatants at the 
back of the force (who would not otherwise have died) in a particularly horrible way, 
so that the surrounding population (ignorant of your true weakness) is terrorized 
into calling of these forces.16
I assume that killing someone in a particularly horrible way involves inlict-
ing particularly atrocious pain to the victim. Now, our Augustinian warrior, 
14 See homas E. Hill, A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence, he Journal of Ethics (1997) I.
15 Here is her proposal ((DDE) stands for Doctrine of Double Efect):
Rawls and Quinn are examples of »threshold deontologists«: avoiding some great cost beyond 
a threshold can override the deontological constraints. Rawls, as we have seen, considers a 
case in which terror bombing is the only option and the just cause is suiciently important. By 
contrast, in discussing Quinn, I have suggested that his approach to the DDE would permit 
overriding the DDE even if there is an alternative way to achieve our goal. So, in his reasoning, 
the cost that goes beyond the threshold is not necessarily only the defeat of one’s cause. he 
cost that goes beyond the threshold can be the diference between the cost of several possible 
courses of action. For example, the diference in cost between course 1 and course 2 might be 
too great to merit staying with course 1. his could be true even though it would be permis-
sible to use course 1 if course 2 were unavailable. he point is that avoiding the diference in 
cost between the courses of action could itself be a goal that is suicient to override the DDE 
constraint. For example, suppose for the sake of argument that it would be permissible for us to 
terror bomb some hundreds of noncombatants rather than do what will kill a million diferent 
noncombatants as a mere side efect. Suppose it would be permissible for us to do what kills the 
million as a side efect if this alone would stop the Nazis. hen, it should be permissible for us 
to terror bomb hundreds to stop the Nazis, at least as the alternative to our doing what kills a 
million diferent people as a side efect. 
 Frances M. Kamm, Failures of Just War heory: Terror, Harm, and Justice, Ethics 114 
(2004) 4, 664.
16 Frances M. Kamm 2004 (n. 15), 656.
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if thus attacked, might choose to defend herself in the proposed way, but she 
would see the situation as raising a dilemma. She would think that killing some-
one in a particularly horrible way is not a thing to do, in particular not killing 
someone who is not malicious, even if, in an important sense, aggressor. She 
might have Williams-style reserves and compunctions: I don’t want to be some-
one who is doing such-and-such thing to a non-malicious human being. Or, 
she might wonder whether her life, whom she is routinely risking in combats, is 
worthy of intense sufering of another.
A philosopher who is not Augustinian and is not in favor of there being 
genuine (unsolvable) moral dilemmas—call the later »anti-dilemmatic moral 
philosopher« for short—will disagree.17 Kamm herself goes on to say:
Presumably one can defend oneself by using such a combatant in this terror-kill-
ing. 
his case shows that killing in self defense and terror-killing are not mutually 
exclusive.18
here are two things to discuss: irst, the example itself, and second, the gen-
eral ways out for the anti-dilemmatic moral philosophers. he example has all 
the typical features of a challenging thought experiment in ethics. How are we to 
imagine the person who is defending herself in this situation, call her Jackie?
Jackie is someone who relectively decides that she is allowed to kill the per-
son killing in a particularly horrible way and will do it, and then proceeds to 
execute the decision. Presumably, she does have compunctions about what she 
is doing. What would this person be like otherwise? he moment you start ill-
ing in the details you see that the story is psychologically at the edge of incon-
sistency. Is the person happily acquiescing in the thought that »Presumably one 
can defend oneself by using such a combatant in this terror-killing«? So, she just 
does the horrible deed, walks away and eats her sandwich. Not very attractive, 
from the moral point of view. Alternatively, does Jackie perhaps feel very badly 
about what she has just done? If yes, at least two possibilities are open. he irst 
is that her bad feeling is not moral regret. She feels like someone who has done 
something very unpleasant that had to be done, is somewhat depressed about 
the fact, and that is all. We might compare her feeling to the feeling of a sensi-
17 Here is Kamm’s generalization of her proposal to the issue of civilian deaths:
In sum, violability, from the point of view of A waging war, in increasing order seems to be: 
Neutrals, A noncombatants, B noncombatants, A combatants, and B combatants. But if there 
is only a discount ratio between combatant and noncombatant deaths rather than a lexical 
ordering, then it is wrong to claim that if one has nonterror (or terror) means to use against 
combatants, one should use them rather than have engagements harming noncombatants. 
he ordering reminds us that we should distinguish between harming one’s own combatants 
and an opponent’s combatants (or noncombatants) for the sake of one’s own noncombatants. 
 Kamm 2004 (n. 15), 680.
18 Kamm 2004 (n. 15), 656.
81
revija za evropsko ustavnost
The Dilemmas of Just War and the Institutional Pacifism
(2010) 13
www.revus.eu
tive doctor who had to operate a patient without anesthetics, has caused him 
a great pain, and at the end the patient has died, not by doctor’s fault. I submit 
that this is not enough for her to be a decent person. What Jackie has done was 
to inlict all this pain for her own, not the ‘patient’ salvation. She had inlicted 
terrible pain, and killed a person, to save herself. And there is something mor-
ally regrettable about having to do such a thing. he alternative would be, of 
course, for the person to feel moral regret. hen, she becomes an Augustinian 
just warrior, morally in pain for the horrors she has to do. 
his brings us to the general issues of how to handle morally problematic situ-
ations in war. Start with deontologists. In order to avoid a genuine moral dilemma 
in the Jackie case, the deontologist will have to say something like this: there are 
two relevant norms, N1 and N2, that prima facie collide with each other. N1 tells 
Jackie that prima facie (in almost no case) she may not inlict lethal pain to a 
(non-malicious) person as a means to her own survival. However, there is a norm 
N2 that tells her that in a particularly threatening situation, when the evil of dying 
innocently is much, much greater than that of inlicting horrible lethal sufering, 
N1 is not binding. We obviously have a threshold here, and the threat to Jackie 
surpasses the threshold, so she my go on with inlicting horrible lethal pain.19
Now, we can ask one of our previous questions in a wider framework of the 
discussion. It concerns actions of people in war, capable of killing and know-
ing how to do it in particular ways; most plausible, this will be trained soldiers 
19 Here is a longer quotation from Kamm, illustrating her proposal:
If enemy soldiers have such reduced moral responsibility for their acts, it may be appropri-
ate for A combatants to take greater risks to reduce the number of B combatants killed and 
for B combatants to defend themselves against even appropriate threats presented by A. A 
nonwar analogy is the person who is morally innocent and yet a threat to us. He may be 
responsible for his actions in being a threat (e.g., a child pulling a trigger) or merely hurled 
at us. Even in the latter case, if he will kill us, I believe we may kill him to defend ourselves. 
However, if we could avoid our death and his as well, by sufering a broken leg, or trying a 
maneuver that increased one’s chance of death only by 0.1%, we may have to shoulder this 
cost. We would not have to shoulder it with a malicious aggressor. 
Would this mean that there is some limit on the number of B combatants A’s side may kill 
in order to save one A soldier from certain death as B combatants attack? I do not think so. 
For in a nonwar analogy, it is permissible (I believe) to kill many morally innocent threats 
to save one’s life from them. But it could mean that A should choose amongst various 
options for engagement so that each member of a large army takes a slight risk in order 
to avoid killing a greater number of enemy soldiers. If this is done, then some one of A’s 
soldiers will die who would not otherwise have died. 
Suppose, by contrast, that A’s combatants need take no risks to reduce numbers of B com-
batants killed. hen it is theoretically possible that from A’s perspective A’s combatants 
should count for as much relative to B’s combatants as A’s noncombatants do. he latter 
ratio is very high, but even in this case would one think that it was permissible for A to ar-
range for an engagement in which it will have to kill any number of B’s combatants, merely 
in order to stop the death of one A civilian? I doubt it. Notice that it could be true that A’s 
combatants and noncombatants have the same degree of inviolability relative to B’s com-
batants, even though A’s noncombatants have greater inviolability than A’s combatants. 
hat is, A combatants can have greater violability relative to A’s noncombatants but share 
the latter’s status relative to B combatants. 
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(full time, or occasional, when the need for self-defense arises). You want to 
train just soldiers for the just war, people who will have a lot of compunction, 
who will carefully distinguish neutrals, enemy civilians, enemy combatants, in-
nocent threats, and be willing to sacriice their own lives in order not to put 
in jeopardy the lives of neutrals and of enemy civilians. At the same time, this 
very person whom you train is assumed to (be able and willing to) kill the right 
target »in a particularly horrible way« should the need arise. How do you train 
any human being for this sort of ventures? hink of a paideia instilling into the 
trainee the soldier’s virtues. How should it proceed?
It was Dostoyevsky who has most famously raised this kind of issues in a 
framework which we might take to be implicitly broadly deontologists (in the 
sense of appealing to duties, rather than to universal beneits, the line embod-
ied in his time and in his country by Chernishevsky). Assuming you honestly 
believe that killing an innocent person is required from you; still, what kind of 
person do you have to be in order to do it without moral regret? Even worse, as-
suming you honestly believe that killing an innocent person for you own advan-
tage is permitted; still, what kind of person do you have to be in order to do it 
without moral regret? What kind of dispositions you would have to cause your-
self to have, as Parit would put it (see the next paragraph). If Jessie had followed 
the role-models proposed by Dostoyevsky, she would have gladly sacriiced her 
life, rather than go the Kamm way. Even if we don’t follow this extreme advice 
of his, this might help us to become more sensitive to the moral diiculty of the 
situation for a deontically inspired agent. 
Similar questions can be raised for the utilitarianism and other varieties of 
consequentionalism, if we deploy the famous strategy Parit used in connection 
with utilitarianism: don’t look just at the act nor at the rules, but at the kind of 
character who would routinely perform actions in question.20 he answer is, 
to my mind, that instilling the routine of killing innocent people, or horribly 
torturing a randomly chosen enemy soldier in self-defense without any moral 
regret, just turns the would-be just warrior into a monster. A lot more should be 
said, but I hope to have made clear that Kamm’s sophisticated ofer of a strategy 
for avoiding dilemmas is not very attractive. 
Until now I have been talking about ius ad bellum (IAB, for short) and ius in 
bello IIB). But ius post bellum (IPB) inherits problems from the irst two iura. 
he main connection of IPB to the two items is in our view a relective connec-
tion: IPB is essentially concerned with establishing whether a particular episode 
of warfare was justly initiated (IAB) and carried in a just manner (IIB); further 
IPB proceeds in the light of indings about the in and ad character of the war just 
inished. It concerns, irst IPB verifying (facts about) IAB and IIB, second, IPB 
proceeding in the light of facts (and verdict) about IIB and IAB and third, IPB 
being impossible without verifying facts about ius in and ad and proceeding in 
20 See Derek Parit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, Chapter 1, Section 14.
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the light of them IPB is in various ways »about« IAB and IIB, where the »bel-
lum« in question is the antecedent war, the one preceding the post bellum activi-
ties considered. We have called this connection between In-Ad and Post »re-
lective connection«. An essential part of IPB is second order, and the rest of IPB 
depends to a large extent on the correctness of the second order verdicts. he 
indings on IAB and IIB both help in setting the goals of and impose side con-
straints upon the rest of IPB activities. Most serious quandaries, not to speak of 
genuine dilemmas from the war itself will relect in the judgment about it, and 
in the eforts for restitution, reconciliation and the rest. 
A lot remains to be said. However, for present purposes I will, with some 
regret, stop here and hope to have persuaded the reader that war indeed creates 
perpetual and very dramatic moral conlicts for all participants, in particular 
for those on the good side. To any morally normal person such very dramatic 
moral conlicts are inacceptable. herefore, there is a very strong and urgent 
duty of everybody to work on prevention of war. How should a paciist do it?
3 TOWARDS A BASIC STRUCTURE: A SKETCH
Before proceeding any further, let me briely address two questions. he irst 
concerns a possible reaction to any argument from the horrors of war; our op-
ponent might claim that post-war justice, dispensed by international tribunals, 
is in principle the adequate answer to the horrors. In a well-ordered world of 
states the outlaw nations that start wars would pay for it in a procedurally cor-
rect way, and the mischief done even by the good side would be sanctioned 
as well; so what further basic structure is needed? he answer is simple. It is 
not only that international criminal justice has been scandalously ineicient for 
decades; ater all, one could argue that it is a ledgling branch of justice and 
will need time. Much more importantly, there is a structural constraint: a sys-
tem of international justice that would be capable of punishing very powerful 
war criminals which are the most interesting ones (that would have been able, 
for instance, to punish the US leaders for things done in Vietnam, or those of 
Russia for war crimes in Chechnya) would by itself require a very strong institu-
tional supra-statal framework. he objection thus turns against its proponent.
he second, and more interesting, is the worry that Friderik Klampfer has 
tentatively raised against my argument from moral conlicts-dilemmas: it is un-
necessary to argue for the need of securing peace from dilemmas since the usual 
just war theory recommends eliminating war anyway: it outlaws aggressive war, 
and nobody wants to be put in situation to defend oneself, so, once aggressive 
war is out, the rational interest by itself dictates prevention, and consequently, 
global peace-preserving system. (We may call it he Redundancy Objection). 
It does not present a grave danger. First, and the least seriously, why not have 
additional arguments for a good thing: the more the merrier. Second, and more 
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seriously, the Redundancy Objection might rest upon a too optimistic view of 
standard just war theories. 
Some authors who endorse the just war view as a component in a general ac-
count of international justice, most famously Rawls, are concerned about pros-
pects for a global peace-preserving system, but, typical ones don’t show this kind 
of concern. Two very prominent ones, Michael Walzer21 and Jef McMahan22 
are nation-state theorists, who incorporate no view of a global peace-preserving 
system into their theory. Finally, the notion of a perfectly just warfare might 
actually act against the impulse to create a global peace-preserving system. If 
I am always strong enough, and can defend myself in a perfectly just way, why 
should I worry about a global peace-preserving system, so why should I accept 
all the limitations and trouble that building and preserving such a system might 
impose upon me? Take as illustration a theory of international justice geared to 
a slightly liberal-nationalist agenda that takes building internally socially just 
states as basic, and is silent or skeptical about international order, along the 
lines of D. Miller, Y. Tamir, T. Meissels and perhaps T. Nagel (see References). 
Call it just nations theory. A proponent of a just nations theory can appeal to 
the notion of perfectly just warfare, in order to argue that a strong and just 
nation that can successfully and justly defend itself, has no need for a global 
peace-preserving system; adding a modicum of nationalism, the proponent can 
then positively argue against a global peace-preserving system. he Institutional 
Paciist theory is not redundant in the face of such a line of argument.
Let me irst point to the well known fact that individual paciism is too weak 
to guarantee peace. his point has been continuously put forward against tra-
ditional paciism. (For example, at the very end of nineteenth century Vladimir 
Solovyev was in his hree dialogues convincingly arguing against Tolstoy listing 
then recent war crimes of Ottoman army against civilians in Eastern Balkans, 
and pointing to the impossibility of stopping such an army by paciic means.) 
Like in other areas, a basic structure is needed, in form of an international sys-
tem.23 Without such a common peace-guaranteeing structure one lives in per-
manent Hobbesian insecurity, in the international Wild West. In this situation 
the obligation of every country is to arm oneself and prepare for warfare, oth-
erwise it will leave its citizens without defense. Every weapon of its neighbors, 
it rightfully sees as a potential threat, which is to be responded to with the in-
crease of one’s own readiness. You need a strong and ready army, which means 
a political force formed and trained for warfare, you need patriotism and cult of 
military leaders and heroes. And even if it merely seems to you that somebody 
21 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York, Basic Books, 1977.
22 Jef McMAHAN, Killing in War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2009.
23 For a general discussion of the idea of basic structure see Liam MURPHY, Insitutions and De-
mands of Justice, Philosophy and Public Afairs 27 (1999) 4. For the criticism of its suiciency 
see for instance Gerald Allan COHEN, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001.
85
revija za evropsko ustavnost
The Dilemmas of Just War and the Institutional Pacifism
(2010) 13
www.revus.eu
is threatening, you had better deliver the irst blow. hus the borderline be-
tween aggressive reaction to what you see as a threat and the pure self-defense 
very soon becomes blurred. And the most peace-loving politician has to pursue 
potentially warlike politics unless she wants to be a traitor. he doves of peace 
have either to become hawks themselves or fall prey to hawks. So, a basic struc-
ture is needed. But what kind of basic structure?
Multi-polar systems do not guarantee peace, quite the contrary. We know 
that multi-polarity can escalate into cold war, and threaten genuine war. Much 
worse, the plausible multi-polar division now is oten civilizational (with re-
ligious belonging as an important component). So, multi-polar competition 
comes quite close to the »conlict of civilizations«, one of the worse possibilities 
in international relations. What is let?
Consider the next alternative, famously embraced by John Rawls, in his 
Law of peoples, the so-called democratic peace hypothesis. Liberal-democratic 
states don’t go to war with each other, is the slogan. Western Europe is today a 
school example of this idea of democratic peace. Today it is hard to imagine that 
England and Spain go into war over the Atlantic ocean, that Italy and Austria 
became bitter enemies over Tirol, and so on. he thesis was announced by Kant 
at the end of the 18th century, thirty-odd years ago it was developed by Michael 
Doyle (see References), and it has a lot if followers today, Rawls probably be-
ing the most famous.24 Of course, he is not naïve about it; in the Law of peoples 
he immediately pointed out that the behavior of the United States of America 
was very oten a problematic exception, and he mentioned the overthrow of 
Allende’s democratic government in Chile, the operations against Mosaddegh 
in Iran and others. Secret operations them were undertaken by state government 
led by monopolistic and oligarchic interests, without the public’s knowledge or 
criticism, he points out. And there are other exceptions, for instance wars of 
Western democracies in the nineteenth century. But he also found an excuse: 
not one of those democracies was actually really democratic. Ater the states 
get close to ideal, the warfare between them will end. His ideal sounds social-
democratic for our views: fair equality of possibilities of all, decent division of 
income and wealth, the role of society as an employer as oppose to neo-liberal 
free market game, basic medical care for everyone and public inancing of elec-
tions. he result would be a »reasonably fair constitutional democracy«. And 
such countries would not go to war with each other. Both Doyle and Rawls use 
the idea of democratic peace as justiication for moderate statism. Since demo-
cratic states naturally don’t go into war with each other, they don’t need any 
stronger supra-state framework. Peace comes spontaneously, its natural habitat 
is an open »society of nation-states«, which does not need covering institutional 
system. Notice that cosmopolitanism has always derived a big part of its appeal 
24 For a recent debate see Paul K. Huth, Todd L. Allee, he democratic peace and territorial 
conlict in the twentieth century, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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from need to limit and ultimately abolish war and warfare. he international 
institutions are irst of all protectors of peace. If states can themselves guarantee 
permanent peace, cosmopolitanism is unnecessary. No wonder that Doyle and 
Rawls are skeptical about the cosmopolitan utopia. According to Doyle the in-
ternational law is powerful enough to establish sharp separation between coun-
tries and to guarantee for the peaceful world of mutually separated countries. 
And the only thing Doyle sees as a system that goes beyond state borders beside 
the international law is the free international market.
hings start looking diferently when we ask a question that Rawls, strangely, 
didn’t ask: why don’t liberal democracies go to war with each other? Historical 
research in very tradition of theory of »democratic peace« ofers unexpect-
ed answers. Doyle’s colleague, Spencer R. Weart had published a decade ago 
a historical study called Never at war- Why Democracies Will Not Fight One 
Another,25 analyzing the actual behaviour of old and new democracies from 
middle-aged Swiss cantons, over Italian early Renaissance city-states, all the 
way to the American intervention in Guatemala. Weart brings in a new obser-
vation and a new idea. he observation is that it is not only the democracies 
that are non-aggressive to their equals: decent oligarchies also don’t like to go to 
war with each other. But, democracies and oligarchies have oten bit each other 
to blood: Sparta and Athens are the irst and classical example. he idea says 
that democratic states look at their democratic neighbors as sister states. We 
are not going to attack a community that is like ours, thought the Renaissance 
Italians. Weart is working on this idea of sister-states (see, for example the last 
section of Chapter Six) and taking a step further: democratic citizen is used to 
bargains and compromises, to non-violent bend with his equals. She sees neigh-
borly democratic communities as fellow-beings, like she sees his co-nationals. 
His analysis can leads us to an interpretation of democratic peace that isn’t sta-
tist. Democratic peace, if it exists, arises from the partial efacement of borders 
between internal and external politics. It is almost the opposite of the statist 
one. Weart himself, is very careful about his conclusion, and irst and foremost 
interested in history, not the future. Still, he concludes: »In their characteristic 
fashion the democracies have been weaving an ever denser web of contractual 
relationships with one another, greatly augmenting their combined economic 
and political strength.«26 Relying on this explanation of democratic solidarity, 
we could go a step farther and answer Rawls in the following way: the explana-
tion of why the countries with a better system of government will avoid war is 
their mutual solidarity, and the habit of treating their neighbors in the same way 
as they treat their own micro-regions, or their own network of sub-government 
bodies. Won’t that kind of solidarity naturally lead to sotening of borders and 
25 Spencer R. Weart, Never at War – Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1998.
26 Weart 1998 (n. 24), 296.
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to creating stable and useful connections between countries, which will natu-
rally point to a supra-state arrangements? And won’t democratic peace in the 
long run undermine moral foundations of statism?
In Europe much of this appears almost trivial: the present »democratic 
peace« in Europe has been secured by building the supra-statal system of the 
EU. At the beginnings of European uniication, the major unifying motif was 
»Never again war!« (Before this, the history of Europe had been dramatically 
demonstrating that in the anarchistic biography of a whole continent made up 
of relatively independent countries, there are more opportunities for bitter strife 
and warring than for peace and reconciliation.) he more recent example of the 
South-eastern European wider region, from Slovenia to Turkey, shows that the 
Union’s membership is a very safe peace-preserving factor: just the bait of fu-
ture membership already achieves much, and once a state is are in, the war with 
neighbors is out. (he two-stage acceptance procedure also follows the original 
paciist spirit and motivation: in the pre-accession phase, the candidate county 
is obliged to come to an agreement with its neighbors about all the major un-
solved territorial problems, so that in the second phase it can become a mem-
ber.) he need for defense from neighbors almost disappears; the situation of 
self-defense becomes a rare except. Any use of force between neighbors is seen 
as an unforgivable scandal that concerns the entire system. he system thus 
treats the safety of individual members in the way a good government machin-
ery treats the safety of its individual citizens. he success of EU in maintaining 
peace shows that the existence of strong supra-statal institutional system is a 
very secure guarantee of peace. Our tentative conclusion is that the »democratic 
peace« is most successful, when supported by networks that go way beyond 
isolated states. It might be successful only when there is such a network, a true 
supra-state system. he democratic peace, thus interpreted, leads us towards 
the cosmopolitan alternative. he only practical way to secure peace is the crea-
tion and sustaining of a global peace-preserving system, i.e. a very strong cos-
mopolitan institutional arrangement.27 Will the cosmopolitan basic structure 
become a monster that threatens us? I was asked this Kantian question many 
times when I talked about this subject. he short history of EU shows that it 
does not have to happen. But I have to leave the issue open here.
4 CONCLUSION: BRINGING KANT AND AUGUSTINE 
TOGETHER
Let us recapitulate. Our argument for institutional paciism starts with the 
pretty obvious fact that war creates perpetual and very dramatic moral conlicts 
for all participants, that was probably noticed by Augustine in the atermath of 
27 I develop a proposal of how such a system might be generated in Nenad Miščević, Nation, 
Border and Territory, manuscript in press.
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the sack of Rome by Alaric’s Visigoths. he unacceptability of such very dramatic 
moral conlicts, together with the general horror of war, »all these great evils, so 
horrible, so ruthless«, as Augustine put it, point to the very strong and urgent 
duty of everybody to work on prevention of war. Unfortunately, individual paci-
ism is too weak to guarantee peace, so a basic institutional structure is needed, in 
the form of an international system. Multi-polar systems do not guarantee peace, 
quite the contrary. he »democratic peace« is most successful, perhaps successful 
only when supported by supra-state systems. herefore, as Kant clearly saw in his 
Perpetual peace, the only practical way to secure peace is creation and preserva-
tion of a global peace-preserving system; personally I believe that one should go 
beyond Kant’s modest proposal and opt for a very strong cosmopolitan institu-
tional arrangement. herefore, to reiterate, it is a primary duty in international 
politics to create and keep functioning a global peace-preserving system in the 
form of a cosmopolitan institutional arrangement.
Let me conclude with a question that would naturally occur to most readers 
from a small country, like Slovenia and Croatia, or from some bigger but neither 
very rich nor powerful country, like the bigger recent members of EU: what can 
my country do about this duty? Isn’t it reserved for the big and the powerful? 
Fortunately, the present-day international system does leave some elbow room 
to the small and not powerful. My home country, Croatia, was a member of the 
Security Council a few years ago, did preside for half a year, and did nothing (its 
chief representative is now being accused for corruption and abuse of position). 
But in principle, a small country can give a contribution to a better international 
structure, out of proportion with its small size. It does have a voice in interna-
tional organizations, and could gain some inluence; so the negative conclusions 
from the ought-implies-can principle do not apply. he duty is there, the gauntlet 
is thrown; the question is who will pick it up, and who will let it lie.
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